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ABSTRACT 
The next -generation human spaceflight vehicle is in a unique position 
to realize the benefits of more than thirty years of technological 
advancements since the Space Shuttle was designed. Computer 
enhancements, the emergence of highly reliable decision-making 
algorithms, and an emphasis on efficiency make an increased use of 
autonomous systems highly likely. NASA is in a position to take 
advantage of these advances and apply them to the human spaceflight 
environment.  One of the key paradigm shifts will be the shift, where 
appropriate, of monitoring, option development, decision-making, 
and execution responsibility from humans to an Autonomous Flight 
Management (AFM) system. As an effort to reduce risk for 
development of an AFM system, NASA engineers are developing a 
prototype to prove the utility of previously untested autonomy 
concepts. This prototype, called SMART (Spacecraft Mission 
Assessment and Re -planning Tool), is a functionally decomposed 
flight management system with an appropriate level of autonomy for 
each of its functions. As the development of SMART began, the most 
important and most often asked question was, “How autonomous 
should an AFM system be?” A thorough study of the literature 
through 2002 surrounding autonomous systems has  not yielded a 
standard method for designing a level of autonomy into either a 
crewed vehicle or an uncrewed vehicle. The current focus in the 
literature on defining autonomy is centered on developing IQ tests for 
built systems. The literature that was analyzed assumes that the goal 
of all systems is to strive for complete autonomy from human 
intervention, rather than identifying how autonomous each function 
within the system should have been. In contrast, the SMART team 
developed a method for determining the appropriate level of 
autonomy to be designed into each function within a system. This 
paper summarizes the development of the Level of Autonomy 
Assessment Tool and its application to the SMART project. The 
conclusion from this on-going effort demonstrates that the Level of 
Autonomy Assessment Tool is a viable method for determining the 
appropriate level of autonomy for each function within a system. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
Many system designers have long sought after the goal of 
complete autonomy. The common question that has been 
asked is, “Is my system smarter than yours?”, rather than 
asking, “How autonomous should the system be?” Therefore, 
many tests exist to address the former question. Obstacle 
courses test mobile systems. Strategy games test intelligent 
systems. The Turing Test is used to determine if the testee is 
truly a human or a computer system. Each of these tests 
appears designed to test one, or a few, specific parameters 
after the system has been built. No tests have been found to 
determine how autonomous the system’s functions should be 
during the design phase. 
The question, “How autonomous should the system be?” 
is of primary importance to the designers of the next 
generation human spaceflight vehicle. Increased autonomy 
levels cost money and time during the design phase. Though, 
if implemented correctly, they increase safety and efficiency 
during the operations phase, which may lead to decreased 
overall lifecycle costs. The goal of the designers is to find the 
optimum level of autonomy that minimizes cost, maximizes 
safety, maximizes efficiency, can be completed on time, and 
maintains complete trust from its operators. This is not a new 
problem, but it can be solved in new ways for future 
spacecraft. 
During the Apollo Program, NASA chose to put most of 
the decision-making power on the ground in human flight 
controllers’ hands. At the time, computers were generally 
slow, they did not have enough memory, and there was not 
enough time to advance the technology before President 
Kennedy’s end of the 1960’s deadline. Therefore, humans 
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made the decisions whenever re-planning was necessary, and 
the astronauts had to rely on the ground-based flight 
controllers for help when problems arose, as in Apollo 13. 
The era of the Space Shuttle presented a different 
paradigm. There was not a publicly mandated time deadline 
for the first launch. There was, however, a serious effort to 
minimize costs. Thus, when the choice had to be made for 
where to put the decision-making power, the answer was 
simple. Any change to the way NASA currently flew would  
cost too much money, and computer technology had not 
advanced enough to allow significant onboard processing 
capability. The decision was ultimately made to keep most of 
the decision-making ability in the hands of the ground flight 
controllers. 
The next -generation human spaceflight vehicle has to 
answer the same question. However, computer advancements, 
the emergence of highly reliable decision-making algorithms, 
and the emphasis on efficiency make an increased use of 
autonomous systems very likely. SMART proposes to utilize 
these changes in the human spaceflight environment to shift 
responsibility from humans to computers, where appropriate. 
In order to determine where the shift from humans to 
computers is appropriate, The Level of Autonomy (LOA) 
Assessment Tool was developed. The LOA Assessment Tool 
seeks to optimize the specific level of autonomy for each 
function within an AFM based on a “common sense” method.  
2.  AN AUTONOMOUS FLIGHT 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM  
An AFM system is necessary for the next -generation 
human spaceflight vehicle to meet cost, safety, and mission 
requirements.   In order to address how autonomous each of 
the AFM’s functions should be, it is important to use an 
existing design program as a credible testbed. NASA’s Orbital 
Space Plane (OSP) must incorporate some autonomy to 
launch, rendezvous, and land without human intervention in 
some contingency cases. Development of one AFM concept 
for the OSP is being performed by the SMART team.  
With a crew onboard and flight controllers on the ground, 
many people question the need for increased autonomy. The 
argument is that with only a few launches per year, and the 
short duration of any flight, the human team can handle most 
of the in-flight problems. What this paradigm fails to 
acknowledge is three-fold. First, many of the most critical 
decisions that ensure crew and vehicle survival must be made 
in split seconds, where a computer might be safer, faster, 
and/or better suited to make a decision. Second, this ignores 
the OSP design reference missions to launch and rendezvous 
an uncrewed emergency rescue vehicle. This requirement 
drives the need for autonomous capability. Third, the 
argument assumes that the vehicles that fly today are not 
autonomous at all. This flawed assumption raises the need for 
a standard definition of what autonomy is and how to measure 
it.  
3.  MODELING AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS 
When defining how autonomous SMART should be, the team 
had different ideas of what the definition of autonomy is and 
how to measure it. As discussions progressed it was evident 
that a method for measuring autonomy was needed in order to 
proceed with the SMART prototype effort. Research into the 
autonomy community did not produce a viable solution for 
use during the design phase. The next few paragraphs 
summarize a few of the sources that were consulted, how they 
influenced the development to date, and the progress that this 
team has made towards developing the method. 
The research began with Sheridan’s Telerobotics, 
Automation, and Human Supervisory Control [5]. Many of the 
recent autonomy articles use this as a reference for an initial 
understanding of how humans and computers interact. Many 
of Sheridan’s examples focus on telerobotics where the human 
is physically separated from the system but still issuing 
commands. While this does not exactly correlate with a 
crewed spaceflight vehicle scenario, it does address the role of 
ground-based flight controllers in the decision-making 
process. The most relevant information comes from 
Sheridan’s trust development issues, such as reliability, 
robustness, familiarity, usefulness, and dependence. While 
these issues were not molded into a unified theory to 
determine if an autonomous system should be trusted, they are 
many of the central issues that define how autonomous a 
vehicle should be. 
In addition, Sheridan proposes a 10 level scale of degrees 
of automation as seen in Table 1. This scale could be re-
labeled as Sheridan’s Levels of Autonomous Decision-Making 
and Execution. Clearly, Levels 2 through 4 are centered on 
who makes the decisions, the human or the computer. Levels 
5-9 are centered on how to execute that decision. Levels 1 and 
10 are appropriate bounds for either issue. The team sought to 
find if others had made the same functional split between 
decision-making and execution of a decision.  
 
 
 
 
   
1) The computer offers no assistance, human must do 
it all. 
2) The computer offers a complete set of action 
alternatives, and 
3) narrows the selection down to a few, or 
4) suggests one, and 
5) executes that suggestion if the human approves, or 
6) allows the human a restricted time to veto before 
automatic execution, or 
7) executes automatically, then necessarily informs 
the human, or 
8) informs him after execution only if he asks, or 
9) informs him after execution if it, the computer, 
decides to. 
10) The computer decides everything and acts 
autonomously, ignoring the human. 
Table 1. Sheridan’s scale of degrees of automation [5] 
In 2000, Parasuraman, et al. provided a revised model for 
the levels of automation with A Model for Types and Levels of 
Human Interaction with Automation [4]. This model split the 
tasks that any human or system would ever have to perform 
into four categories: information acquisition, information 
analysis, decision and action selection, and action 
implementation.  Information acquisition is the task of 
sensing, monitoring, and bringing information to a human’s 
attention. Information analysis is performing all of the 
processing, predictions, and general analysis tasks. Decision 
and action selection result in making choices. For example, 
“Based on the available analysis, what should the system do?” 
Action implementation is acting on decisions or commanding 
new actions. Levels in this category include the computer 
asking for authority to proceed and allowing human overrides.  
Internal analysis determined that the AFM functions fell 
into a similar four-tier system utilizing the terms monitor, 
analyze, decide, and act. Realization of the similarity between 
the two systems shifted the research into finding similar four-
tiered systems. While Parasuraman, et al.  were focused on the 
computer’s process of decision-making, a similar four-tier 
system based solely on the human process of decision-making 
was found. Boyd’s OODA (observe, orient, decide, and act) 
Loop [1], seen in Figure 1, was developed by the military to 
attempt to disrupt enemy decision-making processes.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Boyd’s OODA Loop [1] 
Boyd’s system adds two important characteristics to the 
four-tiered system, feedback and implicit control. Feedback is 
the concept that decisions do not necessarily have to become 
actions. Decisions themselves can spark new analysis tasks or 
requests for new observations. Implicit control is the process 
that runs in the background. For a human spaceflight vehicle 
the background trajectory process is GN&C (Guidance, 
Navigation, and Control). This process has implicit control of 
the vehicle and will continue to carry out its programmed 
commands for the vehicle unless instructed otherwise by a 
human or autonomous manager. 
In a perfectly normal situation, SMART would never 
have to act, as the GN&C system would perform as expected 
until there is an off-nominal current or predicted future 
observation. It is only in this context that SMART would have 
to perform a complete OODA loop and send the act 
commands to the relevant parts of the vehicle. In order to 
capture these additional aspects of a decision-making system, 
the team chose to use the OODA terminology for the level of 
autonomy functional types. Using these types enables the 
ability to break down known functions and to determine how 
autonomous to design each one. 
4.  LEVEL OF AUTONOMY ASSESSMENT 
SCALES 
After determining how to categorize the function types, the 
next question became how to determine the level of autonomy 
of a particular function. Based on research, including Clough’s 
Unmanned Aerospace Vehicle studies [2 and 3], and the desire 
to rank each function type individually, an 8-level scale of 
autonomy for each OODA category, Table 2, was developed.    
The level of autonomy scales are bounded by Levels 1 
and 8, which correspond to complete human and complete 
computer responsibility, respectively (similar to Sheridan, 
Table 1).  The team tailored each level of autonomy scale to 
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fit the tasks encompassed by function type (Observe, Orient, 
Decide, or Act).  For example, the levels in the “Observe” 
column  refer to gathering, monitoring, and filtering data; the 
levels in the “Orient” column refer to deriving a list of options 
through analysis, trend prediction, interpretation and 
integration; the levels in the “Decide” column  refer to 
decision-making based on ranking available options; and the 
levels in the “Act” column refer to execution or authority to 
act on the chosen option.  
The team ensured that individual levels in each scale are 
relatively consistent in magnitude of change between levels 
across the function types. Generally, the levels of autonomy 
can be broken down into three sections.  In Levels  1-2, the 
human is primary and the computer is secondary. In Levels 3-
5, the computer operates with human interaction. In Levels 6-
Level Observe Orient Decide Act
8 The computer gathers, filters, and 
prioritizes data without 
displaying any information to the 
human.
The computer predicts, interprets, 
and integrates data into a result 
which is not displayed to the human.
The computer performs ranking 
tasks. The computer performs final 
ranking, but does not display results 
to the human.
Computer executes 
automatically and does not 
allow any human interaction.
7 The computer gathers, filters, and 
prioritizes data without 
displaying any information to the 
human. Though, a "program 
functioning" flag is displayed.
The computer anlayzes, predicts, 
interprets, and integrates data into a 
result which is only displayed to the 
human if result fits programmed 
context (context dependant 
summaries).
The computer performs ranking 
tasks. The computer performs final 
ranking and displays a reduced set of 
ranked options without displaying 
"why" decisions were made to the 
human.
Computer executes 
automatically and only 
informs the human if required 
by context. It allows for 
override ability after 
execution. Human is shadow 
for contingencies.
6 The computer gathers, filters, and 
prioritizes information displayed 
to the human.
The computer overlays predictions 
with analysis and interprets the data. 
The human is shown all results.
The computer performs ranking tasks 
and displays a reduced set of ranked 
options while displaying "why" 
decisions were made to the human.
Computer executes 
automatically, informs the 
human, and allows for 
override ability after 
execution. Human is shadow 
for contingencies.
5 The computer is responsible for 
gathering the information for the 
human, but it only displays non-
prioritized, filtered information.
The computer overlays predictions 
with analysis and interprets the data. 
The human shadows the 
interpretation for contingencies.
The computer performs ranking 
tasks. All results, including "why" 
decisions were made, are displayed to 
the human.
Computer allows the human a 
context-dependant restricted 
time to veto before execution. 
Human shadows for 
contingencies.
4 The computer is responsible for 
gathering the information for the 
human and for displaying all 
information, but it highlights the 
non-prioritized, relevant 
information for the user.
The computer analyzes the data and 
makes predictions, though the 
human is responsible for 
interpretation of the data.
Both human and computer perform 
ranking tasks, the results from the 
computer are considered prime.
Computer allows the human a 
pre-programmed restricted 
time to veto before execution. 
Human shadows for 
contingencies.
3 The computer is responsible for 
gathering and displaying 
unfiltered, unprioritized 
information for the human. The 
human still is the prime monitor 
for all information.
Computer is the prime source of 
analysis and predictions, with 
human shadow for contingencies. 
The human is responsible for 
interpretation of the data.
Both human and computer perform 
ranking tasks, the results from the 
human are considered prime.
Computer executes decision 
after human approval. Human 
shadows for contingencies.
2 Human is the prime source for  
gathering and monitoring all data, 
with computer shadow for 
emergencies.
Human is the prime source of 
analysis and predictions, with 
computer shadow for contingencies. 
The human is responsible for 
interpretation of the data.
The human performs all ranking 
tasks, but the computer can be used 
as a tool for assistance.
Human is the prime source of 
execution, with computer 
shadow for contingencies.
1 Human is the only source for 
gathering and monitoring 
(defined as filtering, prioritizing 
and understanding) all data.
Human is responsible for analyzing 
all data, making predictions, and 
interpretation of the data.
The computer does not assist in or 
perform ranking tasks. Human must 
do it all.
Human alone can execute 
decision.
Table 2. Level of Autonomy Assessment Scale
   
8, the computer operates independently of the human and the 
human has decreasing access to information and decreasing 
override capability. Understanding the differences between the 
levels is critical to interpreting them correctly. To understand 
a particular autonomy level requires referencing the entire 
scale to see how each level is different from the next, rather 
than focusing solely on a particular level.   
The Level of Autonomy Assessment Scales were derived 
from a mix of research into external autonomy applications 
(Sheridan, Parasuraman, etc.) and the team’s internal initial 
scale development. The intent of the scales is to help system 
designers easily and correctly identify the level of autonomy 
to design each function within their system. They are available 
for either identifying the level of autonomy of an existing 
function or for proposing an appropriate level of autonomy 
during the design of a new system.  The OODA category  
aspect of this scale is advantageous because: 1) it allows more 
specific verbal description of the level of autonomy of a 
specific function than previous scales, and 2) it allows the 
function types to be weighted differently across a particular 
level. The second point is important to understanding the scale 
as a whole. A 5 in the Act column does not have the same 
costs, training requirements, or other assumptions as a 5 in the 
Orient column. 
5.  MAPPING LEVEL OF AUTONOMY ONTO 
A VEHICLE DESIGN 
Once the team developed the Level of Autonomy (LOA) 
Assessment Scales, a method to map particular functions onto 
the scale was needed. Therefore, a common sense method for 
system designers to determine how autonomous each function 
should be was needed. 
There is debate over the trustworthiness of any 
autonomous system. In a field similar to human spaceflight, a 
new aircraft may or may not be considered viable depending 
on an individual test pilot’s subjective assessment. The aircraft 
testing community developed the Cooper-Harper scale and 
questionnaire to attempt to provide rationale for their 
subjective assessments of aircraft handling qualities. The 
logical extension of this process to spaceflight is to develop a 
similar scale and questionnaire to help determine how 
autonomous AFM functions should be. 
The initial assumption is that the system designers, 
programmers, and operators would all contribute to 
appropriately determining LOA. Thus, some questions are 
geared towards training and developing trust in the system, 
some towards prototype design and implementation, and some 
towards testing and verification. This resulted in a robust 
questionnaire, or tool, that addresses all of the identified 
factors for determining LOA.  
The initial tool had one major flaw. All of the responses 
in a given questionnaire were combined into one LOA output 
for mapping to the LOA Assessment Scales. While this was 
the original goal, the initial tool was ignoring at least one 
major aspect of the autonomy question. There is a clear 
difference between how much a human user trusts an 
autonomous system and how high the cost/benefit ratio directs 
the building of the system. If the human does not trust the 
system, then it does not matter how intelligent or cost-efficient 
the system is  designed to be. Similarly, even though a system 
would be highly trusted to work fully autonomously, there is 
no guarantee that this is the most cost-effective method of 
performing the function. Therefore, the scale was split to 
determine two factors: 1) what LOA Trust Limit would ensure 
human trust in the function, and 2) what LOA C/B 
(Cost/Benefit Ratio) Limit would optimize the ratio of costs 
and benefits. 
An example of The Functional Level of Autonomy 
Assessment Tool for the Decide OODA category is located in 
Appendix A. It is a 35-question questionnaire broken into two 
sections. The first half is the LOA Trust Limit, and the second 
half is the LOA C/B Limit. Each section is broken down into 
sub-topics located in the left-hand column. The questions are 
answered using a 5-point scale, unless otherwise noted.  The 
user will place a “1” in the appropriate column to answer 
based on their expertise. The following two columns contain 
relevant notes and a specific example explaining how to 
answer the questions. This questionnaire was developed in a 
spreadsheet, which allows automatic calculation of results 
based on underlying weighting and scaling algorithms that 
were developed. Each OODA function type has its own 
baseline scale for calculations, designed to map it correctly 
onto the LOA Assessment Scale. The two numbers, located at 
the bottom of the questionnaire, represent the output from the 
scoring algorithms for both the LOA Trust Limit and the LOA 
C/B Limit. The numbers are intended to directly correspond to 
the scales shown in Table 2. Though, interpreting specific 
design guidelines from the results cannot be performed yet. 
The underlying algorithms must be calibrated to ensure that an 
output of 5 from the questionnaire matches a 5 on the 
appropriate scale. Until this has been completed, the output 
can primarily be used as a relative scale where one function 
leans towards a higher LOA than another. 
Some questions are designed such that answering “high” 
means very autonomous, while others have “low” as very 
autonomous. This is an effort to overcome the human 
propensity of filling out the questionnaire to achieve a desired 
result. 
   
In use, the LOA C/B Limit and LOA Trust Limit must be 
compared.  If the LOA C/B Limit is higher (more 
autonomous) than the LOA Trust Limit is, then even though it 
may be cost effective to implement an autonomous system at 
the LOA C/B Limit, humans would not trust the system at that 
level.  Since trust is the limiting factor, either the system 
should be automated to the lower trusted level as determined 
by the LOA Trust Limit, or the trust issues should be resolved 
through test projects and education of the users until the LOA 
Trust Limit result increases to the LOA C/B Limit result. 
If the LOA Trust Limit is higher than the LOA C/B Limit is, 
then even though humans would trust a more autonomous 
system, either high cost, minimal benefit, or both is the 
primary limiter in the LOA.  Either the function should be 
designed to the lower LOA C/B Limit, or the cost and/or 
benefit issues should be resolved until the LOA C/B Limit 
result increases to the LOA Trust Limit result.  
6.  RESULTS 
Initial results from the development can be captured in three 
categories: data trends, lessons learned, and future 
improvements. The data trends are taken from the results in 
Appendix B: Sample Results from the SMART Level of 
Autonomy Assessment Tool. A relative trend is that ascent 
functions tend to be more autonomous than other flight 
phases. This is reasonable given the time-critical nature of the 
ascent flight phase. Additionally, decide functions tend to be 
the least autonomous aspect of each of the flight phases. It has 
been the experience of NASA’s human spaceflight program to 
have humans make the majority of the decisions for the 
system. Thus, this category requires the furthest leap in trust 
and the largest shift in paradigms  to allow autonomous 
capability.       
Lessons learned thus far are many and varied, and have led to 
identification of multiple future improvements that are under 
consideration.  Due to the subjective nature of determining the 
appropriate level of autonomy in designing a system, personal 
biases and technical experiences could affect the results. To 
minimize this problem, a first step is to average the LOA 
Assessment Tool results from multiple users. How many users 
are required is an important question, but is probably not as 
important as selecting users with the right mix of 
backgrounds.  The tool might be adapted to account for the 
background of the user and weight their answers 
appropriately. The wording of subjective questions, 
corresponding notes, and examples in this tool is critical, 
especially if the question refers to a length of time or 
milestone (which must be explicitly stated). At a minimum, a 
reference or anchor-point must be provided for the user to 
gauge an appropriate answer. It is critical that the tool be user-
friendly. Answering the questions for many different functions 
can be tiresome, and so every effort should be made to assist 
the user in completing the questions easily and quickly. 
Statistical analyses of the results should be performed for each 
question as a method to discover tool functionality problems. 
Another method would be to allow users a space for 
comments for each question. An administrative team is 
required to properly manage the output, interface, questions, 
and results. 
One of the most challenging obstacles is that the word 
autonomous is  dangerous. The word autonomous is typically 
understood to mean complete computer responsibility. The 
LOA Assessment Tool development process has found that 
complete autonomy is often not practical. Cost, benefit, and 
trust issues limit real systems to practical, intermediate levels 
of autonomy that balance human and computer involvement. 
A broader understanding of this by the human spaceflight 
community would be extremely helpful in developing the 
required trust to operate at a level of autonomy in flight 
management systems that allows for reduced costs, increased 
safety, and expanded mission capability. Therefore, a system 
cannot be defined by autonomous or not autonomous, but a 
system can be defined by the levels of autonomy for each of 
its functions.   
This version of the LOA Assessment Tool was designed 
to determine the division of labor between computers and 
humans for all levels of autonomy. Additional adaptations 
include adding questions that are designed to determine the 
division of labor between the ground and onboard.  Questions 
must also be added that address sustaining engineering costs.  
This issue has proven hard to quantify, even subjectively, due 
to varied backgrounds and experiences with computer 
software. Finally, test cases will be used to calibrate and 
validate the underlying algorithms within the LOA 
Assessment Tool. 
7.  CONCLUSIONS 
Computer advancements, the emergence of highly reliable 
decision-making algorithms, and the emphasis on efficiency 
make an increased use of autonomous systems very likely.  
However, for some human spaceflight applications, full 
autonomy is often not practical.  Rather, a balance must be 
found between how much human operators trust automation, 
and how much benefit and cost savings automation provides.  
This balance typically results in an intermediate level of 
autonomy somewhere between full computer responsibility 
and full human responsibility.   
The LOA Assessment Tool is a combination of the 
questionnaire and the underlying algorithms that produce an 
   
analytical summary of the appropriate LOA for a particular 
function. The LOA Assessment Tool was developed to guide 
how autonomous each function within an AFM should be, and 
provides insight into whether the cost/benefit ratio or trust is 
the limiting factor. The development team first split each 
function within SMART, an AFM system, into a specific 
OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act) category. Second, 
the team answered a set of subjective questions within the tool 
for each function. Then, the tool utilized these answers to 
provide a LOA Trust Limit and a LOA C/B Limit for each 
function. The team then selects the lower of the two limits, 
and compares that value to the OODA-specific LOA 
Assessment Scale for the final assessment of the appropriate 
level of autonomy to design each AFM function.  Determining 
LOA is an iterative process. Throughout the design, prototype, 
and testing phases the team can work to raise the lower of the 
two limits by increasing trust (through training, etc.), lowering 
costs or increasing benefits. 
The LOA Assessment Tool was tested utilizing NASA’s 
OSP program. Expected results were found. For example 
ascent functions are typically more automated than orbit 
functions. 
Work is continuing to incorporate the lessons learned, 
then calibrate, validate, and baseline The LOA Assessment 
Tool. Once completed, the LOA Assessment Tool will be used 
to help develop an Autonomous Flight Management system 
that is trusted to operate in the most cost-effective and most 
beneficial manner possible.        
REF ERENCES 
[1] Boyd, J. R. “The Essence of Winning and Losing,” 
Excerpts in presentation format found on the web at 
http://www.defense-and-
society.org/fcs/ppt/boyds_ooda_loop.ppt, 1996. 
[2] Clough, B. “Metrics, Schmetrics! How do you Track a 
UAV’s Autonomy?,” in Proceedings of AIAA 1st 
Technical Conference and Workshop on Unmanned 
Aerospace Vehicles, 2000. 
[3] Clough, B. “Relating Autonomy to a Task-Can it be 
Done?,” in Proceedings of AIAA 1st Technical 
Conference and Workshop on Unmanned Aerospace 
Vehicles, 2000.  
[4] Parasuraman, R., Sheridan, T. B., and Wickens, C. D. “A 
Model for Types and Levels of Human Interaction with 
Automation,” in Proceedings of IEEE Transactions on 
Systems, Man, and Cybernetics - Part A: Systems and 
Humans, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2000. 
[5] Sheridan, T. B. Telerobotics, Automation, and Human 
Supervisory Control. The MIT Press. 1992. 
 
   
APPENDIX A: DECIDE FUNCTION EXAMPLE 
FROM THE FUNCTIONAL LEVEL OF 
AUTONOMY ASSESSMENT TOOL  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Function Name Scale Type (Ob, Or, D, or A)
Decide
Question
1 LOA Trust Limit
High
(yes)
Med-
High
Med Med-
low
Low
(no)
Question notes Question examples
Ability What is the expected ability of 
developers to correctly design the 
function for all possibilities within the 
design phase deadlines?
Expected ability of designers to 
completely define the world of 
possibilities that this function will 
face, before the final deadline. 
Ability is defined as able to do the 
job, not the designer's ability level.
Designers would have low ability to 
design the hardest or newest 
functions.Thus, hard or new functions 
would be low on the ability scale. 
Though, easy functions or functions 
that we have been doing for years 
would be high in ability.
What is the expected ability of 
programmers to correctly implement the 
design within the implementation 
deadlines?
Expected ability of software 
writers to completely code the 
design that the developers handed 
them, regardless of the size of the 
world that was defined in the 
design phase, before the final 
deadline. Ability is defined as able 
to do the job, not the programmer's 
ability level.
If the developers are only going to 
design for a limited set of cases, it 
makes it more likely that the software 
writers will be able to code it up by the 
deadline.
Difficulty What is the expected effort of 
developers to correctly design the 
function for all possibilities within the 
design phase deadlines?
This is the same as the above 
questions, but the focus is not on 
"how good will the design be?' but 
on "how hard will it be to design?"
Hard (high) designs start from scratch 
or incorporate new ideas where 
expectations are not well-defined. 
Easy (low) designs have already been 
used in this context. 
What is the expected effort of 
programmers to correctly implement  
the design within the implementation 
deadlines?
This is the same as the above 
questions, but the focus is not on 
"will I have good software in time?' 
but on "how hard will it be to get 
the software done in time?"
The code itself may be relatively 
simple for if-then statements, but the 
effort to completely code the flight 
rules into if-then statements might be 
hard to do in the time allotted 
(especially since all of the rules do not 
exist yet). This would be a medium.
Robustness What is the likelihood of an "outside-the-
box" scenario occurring?
Probability statistics or sigmas. It would be difficult to program the 
Orbit Attitude Time Line for all 
contingencies at all attitudes. What is 
the probability that we will find 
ourselves in one of these attitudes?
How well will/can the function be 
designed to manage "outside-the-box" 
scenarios?
Question of returning an answer of 
"Unconverged" vs. "Unconverged 
with an explanation. In addition, 
what has been done in the mean 
time to protect the crew and the 
vehicle." 
Often, this is a timing issue. On 
Ascent, there may not be enough time 
to get the ground operators to come up 
with a solution for an outside-the-box 
scenario, but on Orbit you have more 
time. So orbit would be able to 
manage these scenarios easier. The 
point is that Ascent has to define its 
world of possibilities better, thus 
making it harder to do, and ultimately 
pushing towards less autonomy when 
compared to Orbit
Experience How autonomous (what level) has the 
function been shown to perform?
On this five point scale, what is the 
current maximum level of 
autonomy for a human spaceflight 
vehicle?
If the function has never been done 
before (trajectory shaping) it would be 
low. 
Answer = 1 in most 
applicable column
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Has the function been completed solely 
by a human during the flight phase 
itself?
Either crew or ground operators 
doing this dynamically during the 
particular phase. 
Abort boundaries are predicted 
dynamically during a flight today 
through Human interaction with the 
Abort Region Determinator. Without 
the tool, the human is reliant on the pre-
flight cue-card because the human 
can't come up with a predicted solution 
fast enough. This answer would be low 
because the Human does not do this 
"solely". Though, what Abort mode to 
ultimately choose is decided solely by 
a human for the Shuttle today 
Understandability How understandable of a mental model 
of the function can a human create, 
including how the function works, what 
the output means, how to interact with 
the function?
Are the concepts, themselves,  
involved with this function 
complicated?
Understanding how a neural network 
comes to a decision is very complex. 
This would be a low. If-then 
statements would be easier to 
understand. This would be a high.
What is the level of human 
understanding required to accurately 
decide when an override is necessary?
What level of understanding would 
a human need to have in order to 
determine if the output from this 
function is out of family?
If EVAR is running and gives a 
number of 15, when the human is 
expecting a 0.8, the human would 
probably understand enough about the 
function to override. 
If an override is performed, what is the 
ability of a human to come up with a 
solution themselves?
If a human is going to override, 
they better have a good answer to 
put in its place. 
If a human was expecting the 0.8 in 
EVAR and found a 15, would he take 
the site off the list, or would he be able 
to update the priority table  with the 
correct  number (determined through 
the human's own math).
Art vs. Science How much would a human have to infer 
what the computer "really meant" or 
what the computer will do in the future?
This is truly an Art vs. Science 
question. If performing this 
function is an art form of human 
fudge factors, and post-processing 
mental tweaks, then it should be 
hard to automate. Though if the 
function is purely scientific, with a 
definite answer that needs little 
human interaction to change it to 
be the "correct" answer, then the 
function should be easier to 
automate.
Trending data shows that an engine is 
going to be shut off in 20s. The 
function which determines what Abort 
to declare is currently deciding that 
Moron is the top priority. Though the 
system might not take into account that 
the faulty engine will still run for an 
additional 20 seconds, or that the 
secondary engines will ignite to 
increase performance. With the 
addition of these factors, a human 
knows that Zaragoza is really the best 
site to go to. Thus, 20 seconds later 
when the engine is shut down and the 
secondary engines light off, the 
computer changes the decision to 
Zaragoza. In this case the human had 
to infer what the computer "really 
meant" when it was choosing Moron 
(med-high).    
Familiarity How familiar, friendly, and natural will 
the output feel to the user?
Based on the designer's (the person 
who should be filling this out) 
understanding of the current 
implementation of this function, is 
the output going to be something 
new, or will it be the same type of 
output that humans deal with today.
Basing abort decisions on velocity is 
very familiar to human ground 
operators and crew. SAFM changed 
the measure of landing site ability to a 
single number that is evaluated based 
on its relation to 1. This was a foreign 
concept and ultimately not trusted by 
the users.
Correctness What is the probability that the 
computer could come up with an answer 
that is "more accurate" than a human?
Both a human and a computer can 
come up with an answer that is 
"right". A human may be able take 
the big picture and incorporate it 
into coming up with the better 
answer. A computer may be able to 
run optimization algorithms to 
come up with a better answer.
Choose an Insertion Altitude pre-
launch = low.
Design a trajectory that maximizes 
ascent performance = high.
Training How much training would be required 
for a human to perform this function 
instead of performing the function 
highly autonomously?
Can a human do this without 
computer help?
Making abort decisions without a 
computer requires a lot of training. 
This would be a high. Monitoring 
engine chamber pressure would be a 
low. 
   
 
How much training would be required 
for a human to interface with a tool 
using this function based on current 
understanding of the implementation of 
this function?
Can a human do this task with 
some help from the computer?
Making abort decisions with a 
computer's aid still requires training, 
but not as much. This would be a med-
high to med. Monitoring engine 
chamber pressure would be a low. 
How much verification would be 
required for this function to be trusted to 
perform fully autonomously?
Not intended to be Verification and 
Validation costs, but it is intended 
to be how many cases and 
examples would have to proven to 
work correctly for the function to 
be trusted to work fully 
autonomously.
Adapting the trajectory based on 
launch day winds would be high, 
because of the unpredictable nature of 
the winds. 
Override Is an override capability required (yes or 
no)?
This will limit the autonomy scale 
to allow override if yes is chosen
It may be required for the computer to 
allow human override of abort 
decisions. This would be a yes.
Deterministic How deterministic is the output from 
this function?
If the output is not deterministic 
(i.e. the output is not a specific 
answer) then it cannot be highly 
automated
If the function does not converge, it 
may be programmed to output 
"Unconverged" after a certain time. 
This is a deterministic answer. It is 
when the same inputs produce two 
different outputs that it would not be 
deterministic.
2 LOA Cost/Benefit Limit
High
(yes)
Med-
High
Med Med-
low
Low
(no)
Question notes Question examples
Usefulness How critical is this function to an 
overall Autonomous Flight Management 
system?
While the function itself might not 
be that critical, other functions 
might require this function to be 
done highly autonomously in order 
to work highly autonomously 
themselves.
While predicting future apogee and 
perigee could be done by a human, it 
might be needed to work 
autonomously by the system for the 
anytime deorbit processor. Thus, the 
answer would be high.
How useful would automating this 
function be?
Gut feeling. This function would 
be useful for the computer to do 
instead of the human. 
Automating Pre-launch design is 
inherently useful for the OSP due to 
the small changes that will occur flight-
to-flight (i.e. it is always flying the 
same mission). 
Time How much time is available to perform 
function, considering flight phase, 
circumstances, possible contingencies, 
etc.?
Each flight phase has a different 
scale of time. On Ascent and Entry, 
many decisions may be required in 
milliseconds. This is faster than a 
human could possibly provide an 
answer, trending towards more 
autonomy.
Deciding to shut down an engine, 
given that an observe function is 
predicting a catastrophic failure 
imminently is a split second decision. 
This would be low (or low amount of 
time available). A relatively high 
amount of time might be available for 
some Orbit attitude time line decisions.
Criticality What is the criticality of this function to 
vehicle safety?
Vehicle specific. Attitude time line would be med-high 
due to the need to point radiators away 
from sun to protect the vehicle.
What is the criticality of this function to 
crew safety?
Human crew specific. Pad abort decisions would be high .
Costs How many lines of code are expected?
low <= 1000
med-low <= 10,000
med <= 50,000
med-high <= 100,000
high >100,000
Arbitrary scale based on a few 
conversations with Howard Hu and 
Rich Ulrich. There has to be a set 
scale in order to answer this 
question.
SAFM = 10,000
ARD > 100,000
Shuttle FSW code = 23,000
How much time to design the function is 
expected?
Question of man-hours. The 
deadline for completion is set, and 
this question asks will this function 
be done in time.
Determine the In-Plane Launch time 
would be a low. This is a function that 
is well understood today, and it could 
be designed for OSP quickly. More 
complicated architectural questions 
like how negotiation for propellant 
occurs between flight phases would 
probably take a long time to design 
correctly.  
   
 
 
How much time to implement the 
software for this function is expected?
Same as previous question. 
Focused on writing the code, not 
the design phase.
low = 1/10 of the available time
med = 1/2 of the available time
high = all of the available time
What is the level of required verification 
and validation?
This is the software V&V question. 
How many runs will be needed to 
prove that the algorithms work.
Trajectory Shaping would be very high 
because the possible answers and 
scenarios are infinite. This would be a 
high. Predicting the primary engine 
cutoff state is bounded by the GN&C 
program that flies the vehicle. This 
would be a low.
What is the required skill level of 
software writers?
How hard will the function be to 
program?
Simple prediction equations would be 
lows. High-level decision making logic 
like neural nets would be high.
Efficiency/task 
management
To what degree would automating this 
function increase the efficiency of a 
human or another part of the AFM?
Would this increase the efficiency 
of whoever interfaces with this 
function, be it human or other 
function?
Having the computer filter incoming 
observed information, to only show 
relevant data, would increase 
efficiency by allowing the human to 
analyze the relevant data more often or 
increase the number of parameters that 
are examined. 
Mental workload To what degree would automating this 
function decrease a human's mental 
workload?
Would the human still have to 
worry about this function? Could 
this be automated well-enough that 
the human does not have to think 
about it anymore.
Anything that decreases the amount of 
calculations that the human would 
perform during the flight phase would 
be high to med-high.
Boredom How repetitious is the function (level of 
frequency)?
Answer based on the flight phase, 
and the number of cycles a second 
the function would be performed.
Determine if Pad Abort is necessary 
must be evaluated every cycle per 
second. This would be highly 
repetitious.
How mundane (does not utilize the skills 
of the operator) is the function?
If the task bores the human that is 
forced to perform it, the tendency 
is for errors to increase. Thus, 
mundane tasks should be 
automated.
Simple tasks that have a human watch 
a number to see if it goes over a limit 
is highly mundane.
LOA Trust Limit LOA Cost/Benefit Limit
0.00 0.00
   
APPENDIX B: SAMPLE RESULTS FROM THE 
SMART LEVEL OF AUTONOMY ASSESSMENT 
TOOL 
Function 
Number
Function Name LOA Trust 
Limit
LOA C/B 
(Cost/Benefit) 
Limit
Function type
observe=1
orient =2
decide =3
act=4
Minimum
1 - Prelaunch Ground Updates 4.00 5.63 1 4.00
2 - Prelaunch Vehicle System Monitoring 4.00 5.38 1 4.00
3 - Prelaunch Non-Trajectory-Related Flight Operations Monitoring
4.00 5.50 1 4.00
4 - Prelaunch LW/LT Function Objective Determination 4.71 5.25 3 4.71
5 - Prelaunch Selection of Nominal Insertion Target Altitude 5.22 5.75 3 5.22
6 - Prelaunch Nominal Insertion Propellant Requirement 5.32 5.00 2 5.00
7 - Prelaunch Monitor Launch Window expansion amount 4.00 5.50 1 4.00
8 - Prelaunch Degraded Insertion Target Altitude - Launch Window 
Expansion 4.60 4.75 3 4.60
9 - Prelaunch Launch Window Expansion Propellant Requirement
5.22 5.00 2 5.00
10 - Prelaunch Predict Ascent Performance Margin 5.53 5.88 2 5.53
11 - Prelaunch Degraded Insertion Target Altitude - Ascent 
Performance Loss 4.81 4.63 3 4.63
12 - Prelaunch Ascent Performance Loss Propellant Requirement 5.22 5.00 2 5.00
13 - Prelaunch Determine Phasing Windows 5.74 5.25 2 5.25
14 - Prelaunch Determine Intersection Point or Point of Closest 
Approach 6.00 5.25 2 5.25
15 - Prelaunch Determine Zero Wedge Angle Time (Analytic In-
Plane Time) 6.00 6.00 2 6.00
16 - Prelaunch Determine In-Plane Time 6.00 5.38 2 5.38
17 - Prelaunch Determine Planar Window 6.00 5.75 2 5.75
18 - Prelaunch Determine Planar/Phase Window Overlap 5.94 6.13 2 5.94
19 - Prelaunch Evaluate Candidate LW/LTs Against Constraints 4.60 4.75 2 4.60
20 - Prelaunch Rank Available Launch Targets 4.71 4.75 3 4.71
21 - Prelaunch Store Available Launch Targets 6.35 7.13 4 6.35
22 - Prelaunch Optimum Launch Target 5.32 6.00 4 5.32
23 - Prelaunch Objective Function Selection 4.50 4.75 3 4.50
24 - Prelaunch Nominal Ascent Flight Constraints 4.91 6.00 2 4.91
25 - Prelaunch Planetary Environment Data 4.00 6.38 1 4.00
26 - Prelaunch Vehicle Data 4.00 6.38 1 4.00
27 - Prelaunch Trajectory Data 4.00 6.25 1 4.00
28 - Prelaunch Staging Constraint Parameters 4.00 6.38 1 4.00
29 - Prelaunch Mathematical Model of Objective Function 5.01 5.50 2 5.01
30 - Prelaunch Selection of New Mathematical Model of Objective 
Function 5.12 5.50 3 5.12
31 - Prelaunch Nonlinear Optimizer Tuning Properties Selection 5.74 6.25 3 5.74
32 - Prelaunch Initial Trajectory Generation 4.91 5.00 4 4.91
33 - Prelaunch Trajectory Optimization Analysis 4.81 5.88 2 4.81
34 - Prelaunch Trajectory Optimization Decision 5.32 6.00 3 5.32
35 - Prelaunch Feasibility and Convergence Check 5.22 6.13 2 5.22
36 - Prelaunch Trajectory Performance and Constraint Evaluation
5.53 6.50 2 5.53
37 - Prelaunch Optimized Trajectory 5.84 6.13 4 5.84
   
38 - Prelaunch Candidate Landing Site Status 4.00 4.75 1 4.00
39 - Prelaunch Evaluate Landing Site Coverage 5.63 5.50 3 5.50
40 - Prelaunch Evaluate Abort Coverage 5.12 4.75 3 4.75
41 - Prelaunch Trajectory Shaping for Insufficient Abort Coverage
4.91 3.88 3 3.88
42 - Prelaunch Trajectory Shaping for Marginal Abort Coverage 4.81 3.75 3 3.75
43 - Prelaunch Ascent Target Redesign 5.43 4.00 4 4.00
44 - Prelaunch Continuous Abort Coverage Evaluation 5.53 5.00 2 5.00
45 - Prelaunch Vehicle Internal Systems Flight Rules 4.00 4.63 1 4.00
46 - Prelaunch Vehicle Consumables Flight Rules 4.00 4.63 1 4.00
47 - Prelaunch Ground-Based Systems Flight Rules 4.00 4.63 1 4.00
48 - Prelaunch Space-Based Systems Flight Rules 4.00 4.63 1 4.00
49 - Prelaunch Trajectory - Guidance Flight Rules 4.00 4.63 1 4.00
50 - Prelaunch Trajectory - Control Flight Rules 4.00 4.63 1 4.00
51 - Prelaunch Trajectory - Navigation Flight Rules 4.00 4.63 1 4.00
52 - Prelaunch Pad Abort Monitor 4.00 7.38 1 4.00
53 - Prelaunch Pad Abort Evaluation 5.74 6.25 2 5.74
54 - Prelaunch Pad Abort Decision 5.84 6.50 3 5.84
55 - Prelaunch Pad Abort Execution 6.76 6.63 4 6.63
56 - Ascent Ascent Elements 5.84 7.00 2 5.84
57 - Ascent Ascent Goal Assessment 6.00 7.63 2 6.00
58 - Ascent Predict Ascent Propellant Usage 6.00 6.38 2 6.00
59 - Ascent Projected Vehicle Conditions 6.00 7.50 2 6.00
60 - Ascent Secondary Engine Insertion Burn(s) Target 
Solution(s) 5.22 5.75 3 5.22
61 - Ascent Command Secondary Engine Insertion Burn(s) 6.87 7.13 4 6.87
62 - Ascent Insertion Goal Assessment 4.71 5.25 2 4.71
63 - Ascent Predict Insertion Propellant Usage 5.94 6.50 2 5.94
64 - Ascent Ground Inputs 4.00 7.38 1 4.00
65 - Ascent Vehicle System Monitoring 4.00 7.13 1 4.00
66 - Ascent Flight Mode Applicability 5.57 6.75 3 5.57
67 - Ascent Flight Mode Constraints 6.00 6.63 2 6.00
68 - Ascent Current Flight Mode Evaluation 6.35 7.13 3 6.35
69 - Ascent Hypothetical Flight Mode Evaluation 6.25 6.63 3 6.25
70 - Ascent Calculation of Margins 6.00 7.13 2 6.00
71 - Ascent Prioritize Flight Modes 6.56 7.63 3 6.56
72 - Ascent SMART Commands (time critical) 6.25 6.63 4 6.25
73 - Ascent Command Decisions (non-time critical) 6.04 5.00 4 5.00
74 - Ascent Command Displays 5.43 6.38 4 5.43
75 - Ascent Propellant Status Determination 4.00 6.38 1 4.00
76 - Ascent Propellant Prediction 5.12 6.25 2 5.12
77 - Ascent Propellant Allocation 4.09 4.88 3 4.09
78 - Ascent Propellant Management Execution 6.35 6.00 4 6.00
79 -Orbit create initial trajectory objectives (given mission 
objectives) 4.50 3.88 3 3.88
80 -Orbit create initial trajectory constraints 4.19 3.88 3 3.88
81 -Orbit define traj events 5.32 3.88 3 3.88
82 -Orbit resolve traj conflicts 4.40 4.13 3 4.13
83 -Orbit targeting 6.00 4.88 2 4.88
   
 
84 -Orbit propagate trajectory 6.00 6.00 2 6.00
85 -Orbit evaluate mission/traj objectives 4.81 3.88 2 3.88
86 -Orbit evaluate target collision risk 5.43 4.75 2 4.75
87 -Orbit evaluate debris conjuction risk 5.74 4.00 2 4.00
88 -Orbit evaluate plume impignment on ISS 5.63 4.38 2 4.38
89 -Orbit evaluate D/O handover - Entry team handles all 
subfunctions, post-plan? 5.22 3.75 2 3.75
90 -Orbit determine orbit plan senstivities 4.50 4.13 2 4.13
91 -Orbit modify trajectory objectives (if possible) 4.19 3.88 3 3.88
92 -Orbit create initial ATL objectives (given mission 
objectives) 4.60 3.75 3 3.75
93 -Orbit create initial ATL constraints 4.19 3.75 3 3.75
94 -Orbit define ATL events 5.32 3.88 3 3.88
95 -Orbit resolve ATL & traj conflicts 4.40 3.38 3 3.38
96 -Orbit evaluate thermal 5.63 5.00 2 5.00
97 -Orbit modify ATL objectives (if possible) 3.99 3.88 3 3.88
98 -Orbit post-generated integrated plan assessment 4.09 4.25 2 4.09
99 -Orbit propellent 5.63 5.75 2 5.63
100 -Orbit power - (definitely if solar involved) (a lesser driver if 
no solar arrays) 5.53 5.75 2 5.53
101 -Orbit manage space ephemeris - (support traj constraints - 
lighting)(supports ATL constraints - pointing)
6.00 5.25 2 5.25
102 -Orbit monitor GN&C sensors 4.00 5.13 1 4.00
103 -Orbit monitor GN&C effectors 4.00 5.25 1 4.00
104 -Orbit monitor non-GNC systems 4.00 5.13 1 4.00
105 -Orbit monitor consumables (prop) 4.00 5.75 1 4.00
106 -Orbit diagnose impact of degraded system (human derived 
flt rules live here) (flt phase dependant) 4.71 2.88 2 2.88
107 -Orbit recommend modifications to mission objectives to 
VMS 4.09 3.75 3 3.75
108 -Orbit monitor mission performance 4.00 5.13 1 4.00
109 -Orbit assess orbit debris avoidance maneuver 4.09 3.88 2 3.88
110 -Orbit assess if can include secondary objectives (added 
capablity) 4.81 4.13 2 4.13
111 -Orbit track completed objectives (mission & traj & atl) 5.63 6.13 3 5.63
112 -Entry Deorbit Opportunities Evaluator 5.84 4.88 2 4.88
113 -Entry Phasing Maneuvers 3.99 4.50 2 3.99
114 -Entry Ditch Opportunity 5.53 4.88 2 4.88
115 -Entry Deorbit Opportunities Prioritization 5.22 5.13 3 5.13
116 -Entry Pre-Deorbit Update Monitoring 4.00 5.88 1 4.00
117 -Entry Deorbit Targeting Processor 5.12 4.88 2 4.88
118 -Entry Deorbit Priorities Evaluation 3.00 3.88 3 3.00
119 -Entry Deorbit Targeting Reconfiguration Supervisor 4.29 4.75 2 4.29
120 -Entry Landing Site Selection 4.09 3.75 3 3.75
121 -Entry Landing Site Output 5.43 5.13 4 5.13
122 -Entry Vehicle Monitor 4.00 5.88 1 4.00
123 -Entry Vehicle Reconfiguration 5.22 5.00 4 5.00
124 -Entry Deorbit Target Recomputation 4.29 4.63 3 4.29
125 -Entry Go for Deorbit Ignition 5.32 4.63 4 4.63
126 -Entry Deorbit Burn Trajectory Monitor 3.78 5.50 1 3.78
127 -Entry Deorbit System Health Monitor 4.00 6.00 1 4.00
128 -Entry Deorbit Burn Abort/Reconfiguration 
Determination 3.99 5.00 2 3.99
129 -Entry Pullout Propagator 5.63 6.63 2 5.63
130 -Entry Pre-Pullout Target 3.00 4.25 3 3.00
131 -Entry Vehicle Capability Footprint 5.63 6.25 2 5.63
132 -Entry Landing Site Proximity 6.00 6.63 2 6.00
133 -Entry Landing Site Prioritization 5.32 5.25 3 5.25
134 -Entry Descent Update Monitoring 4.00 5.38 1 4.00
135 -Entry Descent Predictor 5.22 5.13 2 5.13
136 -Entry Descent Evaluator 4.40 4.88 3 4.40
137 -Entry Descent Trajectory Optimization 3.00 4.13 2 3.00
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